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gross domestic product and foreign direct 
investments 
 
 
Mico Apostolov, 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper is to be concerned with the corporate governance mechanisms’ influence on 
governance and enterprise restructuring in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) transition 
economies: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
 
The institutional changes and corporate governance mechanisms in national governance systems 
are essentially important for the transition process, thus there are specificities of corporate 
governance mechanisms in transition economies that indicate the progress towards market based 
economy.  Most notable are: the market-based corporate governance mechanisms, management-
structure based corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, boards of directors, 
management compensations schemes, that is, management structures and financial structures. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are seen through governance and enterprise restructuring 
indicator which has already established link to gross domestic product and foreign direct 
investments in the literature. 
 
The data set is of Southeast European economies, and will be examined the interrelationships 
between governance and enterprise restructuring, set of policies that influence the governance 
patterns, gross domestic product and foreign direct investments. 
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Keywords: governance, enterprise restructuring, corporate governance, transition, Southeast 
Europe 
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Introduction 
 
 
The research in this paper is to be focused on examining governance and enterprise restructuring 
in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) transition economies. International organizations 
classify the following countries in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans): Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
 
The institutional changes and corporate governance mechanisms in national governance systems 
are essentially important for the transition process, thus there are specificities of corporate 
governance mechanisms in transition economies that indicate the progress towards market based 
economy,  the  most notably the market-based corporate governance mechanisms, management-
structure based corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, boards of directors, 
management compensations schemes i.e. management structures and financial structures. 
 
Using data of South-East European economies, will be examined the interrelationships between 
governance and enterprise restructuring, set of policies that influence the governance patterns, 
gross domestic product and foreign direct investments. 
 
Hypothesis: The basic hypothesis to test governance and enterprise restructuring is that it is 
influenced by gross domestic product and foreign direct investments dynamics. 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are seen through governance and enterprise restructuring 
indicator which has already established link to gross domestic product and foreign direct 
investments in the literature. 
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Theoretical and literature framework  
 
1. Institutional changes and corporate governance mechanisms in national governance systems 
 
 
There are many studies conducted on determining the way stakeholders can use corporate 
governance mechanisms in transition. Most often is used the agency theory to explain the 
changes in ownership structure in an environment of dominance  of government and institutional 
owners (Chan, Lin, & Zhang, 2007), as well as, the differences of transition economies’ 
ownership structure in comparison to developed countries (Young, 2002). 
 
Noteworthy contributions are the studies on firm performance and governance structure in 
political and regulatory environments that have a significant impact on corporate governance 
systems (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006). Also, there is significant literature that analyzes corporate 
governance through the importance of strong in addition to good governance and minority 
shareholder protection to reduce agency problems (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). 
 
The institutional aspect of the economic transformation towards free market economies is 
characterized by institutional transition, providing in the literature evidence on the firm behavior 
in such environmental set (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Indeed, business strategies 
(Peng, 2000) introduced due transition are important for this study. These features of Central and 
Eastern European economies are extensively analyzed (King, 2001), which gives good foothold 
for further study of the similar transition aspects in Southeast Europe.  
  
2. Corporate Governance Mechanisms in transition economies 
 
There are number of corporate governance mechanisms which are used to resolve agency 
problems, thus are classified by the corporate governance literature, and the most prominent are: 
market-based corporate governance mechanisms, management-structure based corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structures, boards of directors, management compensation 
schemes, and financial structures (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 2000; Prowse, 1995; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
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a) Market-based corporate governance mechanisms 
 
The market-based corporate governance mechanisms incorporate two basic values i.e. the 
managerial labor market and the market for corporate control (Jensen, 2000), the managerial 
labor market as corporate governance mechanism, verifies the managers’ human capital hence 
determining the managers’ career development path (Fama, 1980). On the other hand, the market 
for corporate control functions as corporate governance mechanism by introducing discipline on 
managers through the threat of takeover (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In context of transition 
economies it is estimated that the market-based corporate governance mechanisms are likely to 
increase and improve along the progress of the transition (Le, Kroll, & Walters, 2010).  
b) Management-structure based corporate governance mechanisms 
 
The role of management-structure based corporate governance mechanisms in the governance of 
companies takes shape through internal managerial labor markets and constant mutual 
monitoring between mangers by creating hierarchical controls (Ocasio, 1999), due to the process 
of firm management (Williamson, 1985).  
 
These hierarchical-bureaucratic structures used to regulate agency problems and manage the firm 
are characterized by layers of management bringing high degree of formalization of operating 
procedures and authority in firms’ functioning and effectiveness (Jensen, 2000). 
  
Hence, the effectiveness of the hierarchical-bureaucratic structures in transition economies 
declines during the restructuring process as market-supporting institutional framework and 
market based mechanisms take hold (Le et al., 2010).  
 
c) Ownership structure 
 
The ownership structure can function as corporate governance mechanism in the sense where 
inside ownership reduces agency costs. Thus, managerial ownership is opposed to the divergence 
of interests between managers and shareholders which leads to maximization of shareholders’ 
wealth in the case of owner-managers’ decision making (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
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On the other hand, the corporate governance literature points out that large owner-managers are 
likely to lessen agency problems, making at the same time principal–principal agency problems 
more severe (Young, 2002).  
 
In the transition process as companies move towards free market functioning, the role of 
ownership structure is determined mostly by independent outside blockholders and foreign 
investors (Le et al., 2010).  
 
d) Boards of directors 
 
In corporate governance literature the board of directors is usually defined as to represent the 
firms’ shareholders. Thus, the boards have the authority over the work of the managers to control 
and monitor their decision making and results (Jensen, 2000).  
 
Due to its characteristics the board of directors has the role of classic corporate governance 
mechanism i.e. central to the internal control system (Jensen, 1993), even though in practice 
often these responsibilities are blurry and undetermined.  
 
As far as transition economies are concerned, the literature suggests that at the early stage of 
privatization the already set, state-appointed board members, are likely to be more effective, 
however later in the transition process when market mechanisms enter into force, outside board 
members that hold large stakes in the firm are ought to offer more (Le et al., 2010).  
e) Management compensations schemes i.e. management structures 
 
Management compensations schemes and management structures can be used as corporate 
governance mechanism through aligning the interests of managers to those of shareholders 
(Bloom, 1998).  
 
On one hand, there can be a scheme where the principal is monitoring the agent’s behavior on 
prearranged compensation i.e. behavior-oriented contract, and on the other, outcome-based 
contract where the principal measures the agent’s marginal output and compensation based on 
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the marginal output (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The use of one contract over another would be 
determined based on industry, legal, and other characteristics important for the firm or the 
country.  
 
Thus, in transition environments most of the early stage countries have predominantly behavior-
based compensation shemes as opposed to those in the latter stage that typify more with of 
outcome-based compensation structures (Le et al., 2010). 
 
f) Financial structures 
 
There is a positive relationship between free cash flow and incentives managers to peruse their 
goals and self-interests i.e. peruse investments that increase their personal compensation and 
influence (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), clearly increasing agency costs.  
 
Further, debt financing is important to a firm and thus essential are the ties to banks and other 
financial institutions that allow access to financial resources (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). In this case the corporate governance mechanism is in place through the notion 
that banks and other financial lenders and instruments monitor their borrowers helping to restrain 
managers’ self-serving behaviors (Berglöf, 1995).  
 
The debt as corporate governance mechanism in transition economies is operationalzed through 
state owned banks at the beginning of the process; however this role further in the transition is 
taken by foreign creditors. 
 
According to Peng  the ‘Two-Phase Model of Institutional Transitions’ is the following (Peng, 
2003):  
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Figure I.1Two-Phase Model of Institutional Transitions 
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Analytical Framework 
 
1. Sample selection and Data 
 
The estimation is based on data provided by the data bases of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition report series (EBRD, 1994-2009), the 
World Bank Database (WB)1 and the National Banks’ databases of the countries in Southeastern 
Europe (BA; CBBH; CBM; CNB; NBRM; NBS) 2. The indicator of GDP is measuring growth in 
real GDP (in per cent) for the time period of 1989 to 2009 (with exceptions for the years where 
data was not available, which is minor) and the indicator of FDI’s is measuring foreign direct 
investment as net inflows recorded in the balance of payments.  
 
2. Model and Econometrics  
 
The econometric model (Freedman, 2005), that is used in this study is a regression model where 
we have estimated the fallowing equation: 
 
ipipio xxi   ...11    (1)   
 
ni ,...1    (2) 
 
Thus, applied to our research this model has the fallowing shape: 
 
tititioti FDIGDPGOV ,,2,1,   (4) 
 where the dependent variable, 
tiGOV , . shows governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 the independent variables, are as follows :  
                                               
1  World Bank Database, Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ 
2 National Banks’ databases of the countries in Southeastern Europe: Bank of Albania [ 
http://www.bankofalbania.org/ ]; Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina [ http://www.cbbh.ba/ ]; Croatian 
National Bank [ http://www.hnb.hr/ ]; National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia [ http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/ ]; 
Central Bank of Montenegro [ http://www.cb-mn.org/ ] and National Bank of Serbia [ http://www.nbs.rs/ ] 
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1. 
tiGDP ,  gross domestic product;  
2. 
tiFDI ,  foreign direct investments;  
   is a p-dimensional parameter vector ;  
  is the error term or noise. 
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Results and Effects 
 
1. Results on the assumption  
 
 
The hypothesis is that the variable governance and enterprise restructuring is encouraged by 
movements in gross domestic product and foreign direct investments. The results of the OLS 
regression explaining the link between GOV and GDP, FDI are given in the Figure 2, whereas 
Figure 3 descriptively shows the relationships and movements between these variables.  
 
The GDP results are significant only with Croatia and Macedonia (p < 0.01). On the other hand, 
the FDI variable results occur significant in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (p < 0.05), as 
well as, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia (p < 0.01). 
 
It is clear from Figure 2 and Figure 3 that governance and enterprise restructuring is positively 
influenced by gross domestic product and especially foreign direct investments dynamics. 
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Figure I.2 OLS on GOV for GDP and FDI - SEE 
 
OLS
Independent 
Variable Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  Croatia  Macedonia  Montenegro Serbia 
GDP 0.0123485 -0.0040617 0.0652003 0.0741883 0.0077875 0.0029588
[0.0128073] [0.0033471] [0.0180422]*** [0.0140246]*** [0.0252081] [0.0184404]
FDI 0.0008832 0.0004519 0.0002227 0.0010187 0.0006387 0.0003701
[0.0003161]** [0.0001546]** [0.0000655]*** [0.0003291]*** [0.0003446] [0.0001059]***
Constant 1.68905 1.498044 2.057019 1.859174 1.540364 1.26501
[0.1252254]*** [0.1140025]*** [0.1346605]*** [0.0845265]*** [0.1623643]*** [0.1800817]***
Observations 60 57 62 63 43 47
R-squared 0.3738 0.4743 0.6528 0.8039 0.4427 0.5747
Adjusted R-
squared 0.2903 0.3934 0.6065 0.7808 0.2569 0.4896
Time period 
Significance Level: *** p < 0.01  ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
1989-2009
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure I.3 FDI & GDP in GOV   
FDI dynamics within GOV indicators 
 
GDP dynamics within GOV indicators 
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Discussion  
 
The results on the hypothesis show that the governance and enterprise restructuring is positively 
influenced by gross domestic product and foreign direct investments dynamics. Indeed, positive 
results in almost all counties are found for foreign direct investments, but still mild evidence to 
its connection to gross domestic product. 
 
The relation of institutional changes and corporate governance mechanisms in national 
governance systems to overall economic movements, and especially foreign direct investments 
has good evidence in the literature and the empirical analyses. Thus, it is apparent that the new 
way of functioning of the systems creates an endogenous competitive characteristics for the 
home companies due time, through the process of learning and cooperation with foreign 
companies or their capital.  
 
Furthermore, it is apparent that governance and enterprise restructuring advance through time 
due to imposed policies, as well as, overall progress of the economies’ gross domestic product 
and especially the influx of foreign direct investments. 
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